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Abstract 
This paper was originally written for Dr. Evan Tiffany’s Philosophy 221 course 
Ethical Theory. The assignment asked students to articulate Richard Taylor's view 
regarding what makes a life meaningful as presented in his paper “The Meaning of 
Life.” The paper uses MLA citation style.  
 
 
In his paper, “The Meaning of Life” Richard Taylor presents an uncompromising 
thesis on the origins of meaningfulness, proposing that as no objective 
meaningfulness is possible, the only remaining possibility for meaningfulness must 
therefore be subjective and acquired by the being itself. He illustrates this view by 
invoking the timeless parable of Sisyphus, a tragic character condemned by the 
gods to roll stones up a mountainside for all perpetuity. Taylor describes 
Sisyphus’s activities as the pinnacle of meaninglessness, and from this he derives 
his definition of meaninglessness: “repetitious, cyclic activity that never comes to 
anything” (38). From this he asserts that meaningfulness must therefore be the 
opposite – but as there can exist no activities that are not repetitious and cyclic, 
and none that are everlastingly purposeful, our lives must not differ fundamentally 
from that of Sisyphus. He concludes that meaningfulness in our existence can only 
be subjectively derived (48). In this paper I will argue that Taylor’s central claim 
that there can exist no objective meaningfulness creates a false dichotomy in its 
insistence that objective meaningfulness must necessarily be dependent on cosmic 
permanence, and that his thesis on a purely subjective definition of 
meaningfulness undermines many aspects of what we typically envision 
meaningfulness to be.  
Taylor commences his essay by conceding that meaningfulness is an 
exceedingly elusive quality to define, and embarks instead on capturing the 
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paradigm of meaninglessness – the existence of Sisyphus. In the original myth, 
Sisyphus had betrayed the gods by divulging a divine secret to the mortals, and 
was therefore sentenced to an eternity of stone rolling. He was to, ever laboriously, 
push a stone atop a hill, only to watch the stone tumble immediately downhill, 
over, and over, and over again (Taylor, 38). It is emphasized that Sisyphus’s 
efforts never amount to any fruition, no temple ever arises from the summit of the 
mountain, and that no sooner does one stone roll down must he roll up another. 
On this Taylor states, “It is not that his great struggle comes to nothing, but that 
his existence itself is without meaning” (39). With Sisyphus as reference, Taylor 
obtains his vision of meaninglessness, which he terms “endless pointlessness” (41).  
For Taylor, our lives are no different that of Sisyphus. None of our 
achievements are, from the cosmic perspective, significant to any degree – all of 
our civilizations will return to dust and new civilizations will be built upon them, 
our accomplishments forgotten and replaced with others. As meaninglessness is 
“repetitious, cyclic activity that never comes to anything and meaningfulness is 
therefore the opposite,” objective meaningfulness must be an impossibility, as all 
of our activities culminate in nothing (Taylor, 38). Each of our days resembles 
one of Sisyphus’s steps – but whereas Sisyphus returns to the foot of the hill once 
more, we leave the repetition to our next generation. The cycle is, by nature, 
endless pointlessness. Taylor describes in vivid detail the lifespan of an unsighted 
worm native to New Zealand, residing in caves and feeding on airborne insects it 
attracts with its luminescent tail. Its existence is brief and without purpose – it 
lies, listlessly, awaiting its next meal until it may one day transform into a winged 
adult that subsists for mere hours for the sole purpose of mating, before it is 
devoured by its cannibalistic kin. For Taylor, all of existence is in essence, “the 
same spectacle” (42). 
Taylor, however, does not conclude on this note. He applies an amendment 
to Sisyphus’s torment, proposing that we envision that the gods, as an 
afterthought, had bestowed upon Sisyphus a perverse mercy in the form of an 
insatiable desire and satisfaction towards stone-rolling. His existence is now 
centered on his singular obsession, and “he no sooner gets a stone rolled to the top 
of the hill than he is restless to roll up another” (40). Taylor claims that, however 
particular this fate might be, it is no longer a condemnation, but precisely the 
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inverse. As Sisyphus’s one pleasure in life is to roll stones, he is assured in its 
endless fulfillment. Whereas previously, it may be imagined that he wished his life 
to cease, even welcoming the release from the agonizing monotony that death 
would bring - he is now brimming with mission and meaning. Taylor ventures as 
far as to claim that with this amendment, Sisyphus “seems to himself to have been 
given an entry to heaven” (40). It is stressed that outwardly, no aspect of 
Sisyphus’s existence has changed, and that the only alteration made was to his 
internal view of his condition. Taylor’s view can be summarized thusly – as there 
exists no objective meaningfulness, the only form of meaningfulness that can be 
attained must originate from within us. 
I argue that Taylor’s view mischaracterizes meaningfulness in one critical way 
– his insistence that the only form of objective meaningfulness must be 
inextricably linked to continuity on a universal standpoint constitutes an unfair 
ignorance of an alternative definition of objectiveness. I concede that if Taylor 
means uniquely to define objective meaningfulness as cosmic permanence, then 
perhaps his thesis stands true. However, it is far more probable that his definition 
constitutes a false dichotomy, for objectiveness need not be conceptualized this 
way. It can also be, more fairly, conceived as denoting ‘non-subjective’. 
Furthermore, it may be of interest to us to envision meaningfulness as a spectrum, 
with one extreme being entirely subjective, the other extreme being cosmically 
objective, and the midground constituting some compromise, wherein 
meaningfulness is objective only in its quality of being non-subjective, or 
independent of attitude. The addition of this midground allows us to account for 
the fact that while it is true that no civilization may be capable of persisting for all 
perpetuity, some do endure longer than others, just as some novels hold more 
significance than others, some leaders have greater impact than others, and that 
these differences cannot be adequately captured by mere subjective tastes.  
I contend that a spectrum of meaningfulness is necessary in the resolution of 
many objections to which Taylor’s purely subjective viewpoint gives rise. Take for 
example, a cancer researcher who is prone to episodes of self-doubt and depression 
– he may wake every Monday morning feeling dejected and utterly detached from 
his work, but regain his motivation the following day. Is his work periodically 
deprived of all meaning, at every moment when he suffers from a fleeting 
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sensation of hopelessness, only to regain it the moment his mood upturns again? 
Taylor’s subjective view would suggest so – but I believe that meaningfulness 
should be grounded in something significantly more substantial than a mere, 
possibly transient, state of mind. At the opposite end of this example, we can 
envision a particularly capricious individual, who, whenever she pleases, dedicates 
herself to a completely different career and outlook on life. She may find herself a 
gardener one day, a dog food taster the next, and a professional Netflix watcher 
the day after that, and believe each of her passing fancies to be wholly and 
unironically purposeful. And from Taylor’s viewpoint, her life would be entirely 
meaningful.  
I propose a far more plausible conceptualization of meaningfulness – one that 
is bipartite in its recognition of both subjective engagement and non-subjective 
worth as composites of meaningfulness. As an illustration, consider four variations 
on the myth of Sisyphus. Sisyphus 1 is the original, neither engaged in his 
activities nor accomplishing anything of non-subjective worth. Sisyphus 2 is 
Taylor’s alteration, thoroughly engaged but nevertheless still performing activities 
that constitute endless pointlessness. This is where Taylor’s considerations 
conclude, but I propose two additional modifications – let us envision Sisyphus 3, 
who, instead of stone rolling, was sentenced to the construction of a palatial 
temple at the summit of the mount, the completion of which would draw in 
countless parishioners who would visit, seeking divine connection and profound 
introspection. He is as detached to his work and as laboriously tormented as 
Sisyphus 1, but surely now, his activities have gained some non-subjective 
significance. Compare him to Sisyphus 4, who is also constructing such a temple, 
and shares the same attitude towards his activities as does Sisyphus 2. Sisyphus 4 is 
both subjectively engaged and his activities have some degree of non-subjective 
culmination.  
It is evident to me that Sisyphus 4 is the most preferable version, so much so 
that had the ancients originally recounted this version, it is entirely possible that 
Sisyphus would no longer encapsulate the epitome of meaninglessness, but rather, 
its direct antithesis. It is equally clear to me that Sisyphus 3 cannot be entirely 
discounted on the basis of his lack of subjective engagement. My theory is as 
follows: the optimal form of meaningfulness should ideally contain the maximum 
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of both subjective engagement and non-subjective worth, but the diminution of 
either qualities does not completely nullify the meaningfulness of a life. As such, 
both Sisyphus 2 and Sisyphus 3 have existences of some degree of meaningfulness, 
and while it may be preferable to be Sisyphus 2 instead of Sisyphus 3, the most 
favorable choice is without doubt, Sisyphus 4. The inclusion of activities of non-
subjective worth as a composite of meaningfulness allows us to accord some 
meaningfulness into the lives of individuals who pursue activities of worth but do 
so listlessly, as with the aforementioned cancer researcher, and to individuals who 
are entirely engaged, albeit in activities that are relatively inconsequential.  
While Taylor’s argument for the meaning of life may be persuasive in its 
simplicity, it ultimately fails on two fronts: firstly, in its creation of a false 
dichotomy by necessarily connecting objective meaningfulness with cosmic 
permanence, and secondly, in its inability to ground meaningfulness as more 
substantial than a mere mood. Taylor claims, “the meaning of life is from within 
us” (47) but it is evident that subjective engagement alone is inadequate in 
capturing the quality that some activities have which renders them non-
subjectively more significant than others. As such, it is probable that my theory 
better describes the dualistic nature of meaningfulness as dependent on both 
subjective engagement and non-subjective worth.  
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